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A recent report indicates that a newly developed malicious app for Android is
introduced every 11 seconds. To combat this alarming rate of malware creation, we
need a scalable malware detection approach that is effective and efficient. In this thesis,
we introduce SigPID, a malware detection system based on permission analysis to cope
with the rapid increase in the number of Android malware. Instead of analyzing all 135
Android permissions, our approach applies 3-level pruning by mining the permission
data to identify only significant permissions that can be effective in distinguishing
benign and malicious apps. Based on the identified significant permissions, SigPID
utilizes classification algorithms to classify different families of malware and benign
apps. Our evaluation finds that only 25% of permissions (34 out of 135 permissions)
are significant. We then compare the performance of our approach, using only 25%
of all permissions, against a baseline approach that analyzes all permissions. The
results indicate that when Support Vector Machine (SVM) is used as the classifier, we
can achieve over 90% of precision, recall, accuracy, and F-measure, which are about
the same as those produced by the baseline approach. We also show that SigPID is
effective when used with 67 other commonly used supervised learning approaches. We
find that 55 out of 67 algorithms can achieve F-measure of at least 85%, while the
average running time can be reduced by 85.6% compared with the baseline approach.
When we compare the detection effectiveness of SigPID to those of other approaches,

SigPID can detect 96.54% of malware in the data set while other approaches detect
3.99% to 96.41%.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Android is currently the most used smart-mobile device platform in the world, occupying 82.8% of market share [1]. As of now, there are nearly 2 million apps available for
downloading from Google Play, and more than 50 billion downloads to date. Unfortunately, the popularity of Android also creates interests from cyber-criminals who create
malicious apps that can steal sensitive information and compromise systems. Unlike
other competing smart-mobile device platforms, such as iOS, Android allows users to
install applications from unverified sources such as third party stores. This problem
has been so serious that a recent report indicates that 97% of all mobile malware target
Android devices [2]. In 2015 alone, over 2.3 million new malicious apps have been
uncovered. This roughly translates to an introduction of a new malicious Android
app every 11 seconds [3]. These malicious apps are created to perform different types
of attacks in the form of trojans, worms, exploits, and viruses. Each type of malicious
apps has at least 50 variants, which makes it extremely challenging to detect them
all [4].
To address security concerns, researchers have used various approaches including
static and dynamic analyses, machine learning, and data mining to develop malware
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detection tools. For example, RiskRanker [5] uses static analysis to discover malicious
behaviors in Android apps. Stowaway [6] is another static analysis tool that detects
overprivilege in Android apps. While these approaches can identify potential malicious
code sections, they also tend to produce a large number of false positives. To increase
the analysis precision, researchers have also used dynamic analysis to capture execution
context. For example, TaintDroid [7] dynamically tracks multiple sensitive data
source simultaneously. The weakness of TaintDroid is that manual efforts to traverse
user interfaces are needed to cover dangerous functionality effectively. Dynamic analysis
approaches, in general, also need effective input suites to adequately exercise execution
paths.
As such, work by Petra’s et al. [8] shows that dynamic program analysis alone is
not enough to assure Android security. They present a broad range of anti-analysis
techniques for malware to successfully evade dynamic analysis. Therefore, more efforts
have recently been spent on using machine learning and data mining techniques to
detect Android malware based on permissions. For example, DREBIN [9] combines
static analysis and machine learning techniques to detect Android malware. The
experimental result shows that DREBIN can achieve high detection accuracy by
using as many features as possible to aid detection. However, using more features also
increases the overhead of their system.
In this thesis, we present SigPID, an approach that extracts significant permissions
from apps, and uses the extracted information to effectively detect malware using
supervised learning algorithms. The design objective of SigPID is to detect malware
efficiently and accurately. As stated earlier, the number of newly introduced malware
is growing at an alarming rate. As such, being able to detect malware efficiently
would allow analysts to be more productive in identifying and analyzing them. Our
approach analyzes permissions and then identifies only the ones that are significant
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in distinguishing between malicious and benign apps. Specifically, we propose a
multi-level data pruning approach including permission ranking with negative rate,
permission mining with association rules and support based permission ranking to
extract significant permissions strategically. Then, classification algorithms are used
to classify different types of malware and benign apps.
The results of our empirical evaluation show that SigPID can cut down the
number of permissions that we need to analyze by 75%, while maintaining over 90%
malware detection accuracy and F-measure when Support Vector Machine (SVM) is
used as the classifier. To show the generality of this approach, we also test SigPID
with 67 commonly used supervised algorithms and find that it maintains very high
accuracy with these algorithms. We also compare the accuracy and running-time
performance of our approach against DREBIN [9], Permission-Induced Risk
Malware Detection [10], and existing virus scanners. We find that our approach
can detect more malware than the other approaches.

1.1

Contributions

1. We develop SigPID, an approach that identifies a subset of permissions (significant permissions) that can be used to effectively identify malware. By using our
technique, the number of permissions that needs to be analyzed is reduced by
75%.
2. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach using only a quarter of the total
number of permissions in Android. We find that SigPID can achieve over 90% in
precision, recall, accuracy, and F-measure. These results compare favorably with
those achieved by an approach that uses all 135 permissions. When we evaluate
the malware detection effectiveness of SigPID, we find that our approach is
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more effective by detecting 96.54% of malicious apps in the data set while other
approaches including Drebin and commercial virus scanners, can only detect
3.99% to 96.41% of malware.
3. To show that the approach can work generically with other supervised learning
algorithms, we apply SigPID with commonly used 67 supervised learning
algorithms and a much larger dataset (5,494 malicious and 310,926 benign apps).
We find that 55 out of 67 algorithms can achieve F-measure of at least 85%,
while the average running time can be reduced by 85.6% compared with the
baseline approach.

1.2

Organization

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the implementation
details of the proposed SigPID. Chapter 3 reports the results of our empirical
evaluations. Chapter 4 compares our work to other related work. The last Chapter
concludes this thesis.

5

Chapter 2
Introducing SigPID: Significant
Permission Identification for Android
Malware Detection
The goal of Significant Permission IDentification (SigPID) system is to achieve high
malware detection accuracy and efficiency while analyzing the smallest number of
permissions. To do so, our system extracts permission lists from application packages
but instead of focusing on all permissions, SigPID mainly focuses on permissions
that can improve the malware detection rate. This, in effect, eliminates the need to
analyze permissions that have little or no significant influence on malware detection
effectiveness. In a nutshell, SigPID prunes permissions that have low impacts on
detection effectiveness using multi-level data pruning, which consists of three major
components: (i) permission ranking with negative rate; (ii) permission mining with
association rules; and (iii) support based permission ranking. After pruning, SigPID
employs supervised machine learning classification methods to identify potential
Android malware. Finally, SigPID reports malware detection summary to the analysts.
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The complete system architecture of SigPID is shown in Figure 2.1. We then describe
the key components in the remainder of this chapter.
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Figure 2.1: System Overview Process including Three Main Parts:Data Pre-Processing,
Building Detection System, Detection Analysis

2.1

Multi-Level Data Pruning (MLDP)

A key component of SigPID is the multi-level data pruning process to reduce our
permission dataset. Android apps can have up to 135 permissions in total. Most apps
do not request all 135 permissions. The ones that an app requests are listed in the apk
as part of manifest.xml. When we need to analyze a large number of apps (e.g., several
hundred thousand), the total number of permissions requested by all apps can be
overwhelmingly large, resulting in long analysis time. This high analysis overhead can
negatively affect the malware detection efficiency as it reduces analyst productivity.
To address this problem, we use three levels of data pruning methods to filter out
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Permission Ranking with Negative Rate

1

Permission Mining with Association Rules

2

Support Based Permission Ranking

Figure 2.2: Multi-Level Data Pruning
permissions that contributed little to the malware detection effectiveness. Thus, they
can be safely removed without negatively affecting malware detection accuracy. The
complete procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.2. We then describe each level in the
pruning process.

2.1.1

Permission Ranking with Negative Rate

Each permission describes a particular operation that an app is allowed to perform.
For instance, permission INTERNET indicates whether the app has access to the
Internet. Different types of benign apps and malicious apps may request a variety
of permissions corresponding to their operational needs. For malicious apps, we
hypothesize that their needs may have common subsets. We have seen research efforts
that try to use permissions to detect malware [9] [10]. Thus, if they do indeed fall into
common subsets, we may not need to analyze all 135 permissions to build an effective
malware detection system.
As such, our focus is more on the permissions that create high risk attack surfaces and are frequently requested by malware samples. Our pruning also includes
permissions that are rarely requested by the malware so that we can use this information to differentiate between malware and benign apps. At the same time, we also
exclude permissions that are commonly used by both benign and malicious apps, as
they introduce ambiguity in the malware detection process. For instance, permission
INTERNET are frequently requested by both malware and benign apps, as almost
all apps will request to access the Internet. Incorporating permission INTERNET
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for malware detection does not provide any benefits. Therefore, our approach prunes
permission INTERNET.
As the next step, we rank permissions based on how they are used by malicious
and benign apps. Ranking is not a new concept. Prior work have also used generic
permission ranking strategy such as mutual information to identify high risk permissions [10]. However, their approaches tend to only focus on high risk permissions, and
ignore no-risk permissions, which are significant permissions in our approach.
Our approach, referred to as Permission Ranking with Negative Rate or PRNR,
provides a concise ranking and comprehensible results. The approach operates on
two matrices, M and B. M represents a list of permissions used by malware samples
and B represents a list of permissions used by benign apps. Mij represents whether
the j th permission is requested by the ith malware sample, while ‘1’ indicates yes, ‘0’
indicates no. Bij represents whether the j th permission is requested by the ith benign
app sample.
Before computing support of permissions from matrices M and B, we first check
their sizes. Typically, the number of benign apps (over 300,000 in this thesis) tends
to be much larger than the number of malicious apps (5,500 samples in this thesis);
as such, the size of B can be much larger than the size of M . With our ranking
scheme, we prefer the data set on the two matrices to be more balanced. Training over
imbalanced dataset can lead to skewed models [9]. For example, in the case where
the size of matrix M is 10 and the size of matrix B is 1000, after applying supervised
machine learning techniques for classification, the classification models mainly skew
towards capturing the characteristics of matrix B, thereby affecting classification
accuracy.
As a result, we first compute their difference using the equation below:
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|size(Mj ) − size(Bj )|
< ε,
min(size(Mj ), size(Bj ))

(1)

where size(Mj ) represents the number of rows in M and size(Bj ) represents the
number of rows in B. Variable ε provides the difference in sizes of the two matrices. In
this work, ε is very small due to a much larger number of benign apps. The quantity ε
can be manually set by policies based on different types of the datasets. In this thesis,
we simply set ε to 1.
If we find the difference is smaller than ε (i.e., Eq. 1 holds), PRNR can be
implemented using the following equation:
P

P
Mij − Bij
i
i
P
R(Pj ) = P
,
Mij + Bij
i

(2)

i

where R(Pj ) represents the rate of j th permission used for permission ranking.
If we find the difference is bigger than ε (i.e., Eq. 1 does not hold), we need to first
balance these two matrices. To do so, we offer two policies. We denote the number
of samples in the larger dataset as LN , and the number of samples in the smaller
dataset as SN . The first policy randomly selects SN samples from the larger dataset.
The second policy uses the equation below to calculate the support of each permission
in the larger dataset and then proportionally scales down the corresponding support
to match that of the smaller dataset. This can balance the two matrices in spite of
their difference in sizes. In the equation 3, variable Pj denotes the j th permission in
the case that the number of rows of B is bigger than that of M , we have:
P
SB (Pj ) =

Bij

i

size(Bj )

∗ size(Mj ),

SB (Pj ) represents the support of j th permission in matrix B.

(3)
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After balancing these two matrices by using eqution 3, PRNR can be implemented
using the following modified equation:
P
Mij − SB (Pj )
i
R(Pj ) = P
Mij + SB (Pj )

(4)

i

The PRNR algorithm is used to perform ranking of our datasets. In the formula
above, R(Pj ) represents the rate of j th permission. The result of R(Pj ) has a value
ranging between [-1, 1]. If R(Pj ) = 0, this is implies that both benign and malicious
apps equally request Pj . This also means that Pj has very little impact on malware
detection effectiveness. If R(Pj ) = 1, this means that permission Pj is only used in
malicious dataset, which is a high risk permission. If R(Pj ) = -1, this means that
permission Pj is only used in benign dataset which is a low risk permission. Based on
the rate of permission with PRNR, we can classify the permissions into two lists: a
benign permission list which contains the permissions with negative rates and sorted
from -1 to 0, and a malicious permission list which contains permissions with positive
rates sorted from 1 to 0. We then remove low impact permissions whose R(Pj ) are
close to 0.
At this point, we have created two sorted permission lists: a benign permission
list and a malicious permission list through the use of PRNR. Next, we design a
Permission Incremental System (PIS ) to incrementally include permissions based
on the order in the two lists. For example, we choose the top permission in the
benign list and the top permission in the malicious list as our input features to build
malware detection. We then evaluate malware detection by using the following metrics:
precision, recall, accuracy, and F-measure. In this thesis, we generate ten sub-datasets
by randomly choosing 5,494 benign apps from 310,926 benign apps, so that we can
calculate the standard deviation of every performance metric. Next, we choose the
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top three permissions in both lists to build malware detection. Then, we repeat the
process again while increasing the number of top permissions to use for malware
detection. The main goal is to find the smallest number of permissions that yields a
very similar malware detection effectiveness as that of using the entire data set.
In our thesis, we find that using 66 permissions performs nearly as well as using
the whole 135 permissions, as shown in Section 3.2.1. We are able to achieve 91.01%
malware detection accuracy while using only 49% of the permissions. Using all 135
permission yields virtually the same effectiveness (90.80%).

2.1.2

Permission Mining with Association Rules

In this section, we introduce the second pruning process in MLDP. After pruning 69
of 135 permissions by using PRNR and PIS, we want to further explore approaches
that can reduce non-influential permissions even more. By inspecting the reduced
permission list (66 in this case), we find that some permissions always appear together
in an app. For example, permission WRITE_SMS and permission READ_SMS are
always used together. They both also belong to the malicious permission list. As
such, we can associate one, which has higher support, to its partner. This way, one
permission can represent both of them. In this example, we can remove permission
WRITE_SMS. In order to find permissions that occur together, we apply permission
mining with association rules (PMAR).
Data mining with association rules is a method for discovering interesting relations
between variables in large databases. For instance, if A and B always occur together,
this has high confidence which could be interesting for us. In this thesis, we only
consider rules with high confidence, so applying permission mining with association
rules only produces a few rules. We employ Apriori, a commonly used association
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mining algorithm, to generate the association rules based on our dataset. Apriori [11]
uses a breadth-first search strategy to count the support of itemsets and uses a
candidate generation process, which exploits the downward closure property of the
support. In this case, we only want to generate the association rules with high
confidence even if the permissions have small support values.
Using association rules identified from the permission data, we find 6 rules when
we set 98% minimum confidence and 3% as minimum support with Apriori. We
remove these 6 permissions from the current dataset of 66 permissions in total. With
60 permissions (55.6% reduction in the number of permissions), we achieve 92.06%
detection accuracy, as shown in Section 3.2.2.

2.1.3

Support Based Permission Ranking

At this point, we have reduced the number of permissions needed to perform malware
detection by 55%. To further reduce the number of permissions, we turn our focus
to the support of each permission. Typically, if the support of a permission is too
low, it does not have much impact on malware detection. For instance, we find the
permission BIND_TEXT_SERVIC only in benign apps. As such, we may think that
any app that uses BIND_TEXT_SERVICE is benign. However, this permissions is
used only by one app out of over 300,000 benign apps. As such, only relying on the
rate provided by PRNR is inaccurate. We also need to prune out permissions with
low support.
To prune out permissions with low support, one obvious option is to rank permissions based on support and then use PIS to find the least number of permission
that yields high accuracy. However, there is an approach based on using a support
threshold that involves less complexity and can result in shorter analysis time. To

13
do so, we set a support threshold γ, and any support value for a permission that is
smaller than γ would be pruned. A large value of γ would allow us to prune more
permissions, but it also reduces accuracy and F-measure. A small value of γ would
maintain more permissions, resulting in higher runtime overhead. To balance the
accuracy and the efficiency, we experiment with different values and find that 0.5%
yields a good balance, so it is used as the threshold in this thesis.

2.2

Malware Detection using Significant
Permissions

We first use SVM and a small dataset to test our MLDP model from the previous
section. SVM determines a hyperplane that separates both classes with a maximal
margin based on the training dataset that includes benign and malicious application.
In this case, one class is associated with malware, and the other class is associated
with benign apps. Then, we assume the testing data as unknown apps which will
be classified by mapping the data to the vector space to decide whether it is on
the malicious or benign side of the hyperplane. Then, we can compare all analysis
results with their original records to evaluate the malware detection correctness of the
proposed model by using SVM.
In order to show applicability and scalability of MLDP, we employ 67 commonly
known machine learning algorithms and enlarge our dataset. We compare the results
between malware detection rate using all 135 permissions (baseline) and malware
detection using MLDP for each supervised machine learning algorithms, as shown
in Section 3.3. We observe that machine learning algorithms with a tree structure
usually build better malware detection compared to others. However, they also tend to
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take more time and memory. Consequently, it is more advantageous to use MLDP to
perform malware detection as it can be as effective while conserving time and memory.
We will provide more details in the next section.

2.3

Advanced MLDP with Fusion of Multiple Lists
and X-value

There are two obvious inefficiency of SIGPID when we use MLDP for significant
permissions. First, there are two ranking lists as the system implements two PIS in
MLDP. Processing each PIS can take a significant amount of time. Second, we do
not know the least number of permissions that can help us to build a good malware
detection system when we implement PIS. Finding the least number of permissions
would enable us to build a high performance malware detection system based on PIS.
In order address these two short-comings of MDLP, we introduce a new algorithm
called FML (Fusion of Multiple Lists) and a new attribute called X-value. Next, we
describe them in turn.

2.3.1

Fusion of Multiple Lists

The first algorithm fuses multiple lists into one list before ranking each of them in
MLDP. Fusion of Multiple Lists (FML) allows us to apply PIS only once to the
resulting list instead of twice as in MLDP prior to applying this optimization. Since
processing PIS is a time consuming process, this optimization can make approach
more efficient. The fusion process contains three steps.
Step 1: The algorithm combines the positive rate and negative rate lists. After it
calculates the R(Pj ), the rate of each permission falls between -1 and 1. However,
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both extreme values are significant to classify applications, as such, we can simplify
these values by considering the absolute value of all rates R(Pj ) for each permission.
Then, our algorithm calculates the maximum value, minimum value, median value,
mean value, and standard deviation of each list. If it follows the normal distribution
such as the positive-rate list, we prune the dataset in the first step by removing any
permission whose rate is less than mean − standard deviation. If the list does not
follow the normal distribution such as the frequency list, our algorithm removes any
permission, which has no contributions. For example, we have total about 11,000
applications for building malware detection system. If some permissions are used fewer
than 11 times in all apps, whose support is less than 0.1% (α), it should be removed.
Step 2: After data pruning in the first step, we normalize the scores of each list to the
maximum value. This causes each updated score to be in the range of 0 and 1. Next,
the algorithm sorts the remaining permissions alphabetically and put the normalized
scores of each permission on the two lists in a table (e.g., Permission, Normalized
Score from Positive List, Normalized Score from Frequency List).
Step 3: Choose a function for multiple normalized lists. We create a table in Step
2, and each permission has two normalized scores from positive-rate list and frequency
list. In the table, we use S1i represent the normalized score from positive-rate list
for ith permission, and S2i represent the normalized score from frequency list for ith
permission. We need to calculate a new score which can represent two scores and be
used in the fusion list. As a result, here we choose to use math function to calculate a
new score, where Si is a new score for ith permission. There are multiple approaches
to calculate a new score, each way also causes different scores in the new fusion list.
To identify a suitable approach, we experiment with three functions described next.

Si = (S1i + S2i )/2,

(5)
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Function 5 considers the total score of S1i and S2i for ith permission. Although
S1i is a small score, ith permission still can be considered as a significant permission
when S2i is a very large score.

Si = S1i ∗ S2i ,

(6)

Function 6 considers the multiple score of all normalized score in multiple lists.
For example, when S1i = 1 , S2i = 0.1, S1j = 0.5 and S2i = 0.5, Si is higher than Sj
if we choose to use Function 5 and Sj is higher than Si if we use Function 6.

Si = 1/2 ∗ (S1i + S2i ) ∗ (S1i ∗ S2i ),

(7)

Function 7 combines multiple score and the total score of all normalized scores in
multiple lists produce the best result.

2.3.2

X-value

We introduce X-value to find the the least number of permission for PIS. X-value is
the average distance between recall to f-measure and precision to f-measure which
can help us identify the least number of permissions that returns a high and stable
f-measure.
When we process PIS in the two datasets, it always shows similar precision, recall
and f-measure. Precision initially decreases, and then subsequently increases. Recall
initially increases then decreases. At some point, precision, recall and f-measure are
very close and then f-measure subsequently becomes stable meaning changes occur in
small ranges.
Based on an empirical evaluation, at some point X-value approaches 0, meaning
all three values are almost the same. Thus, we can set a small value β. If X − value
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is smaller than β, this is a point where f-measure is stable. As such, X-value helps us
to identify the best point to stop PIS and also the least permissions that can be used
for for malware detection.
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Table 2.1: Rankings by PRNR
Permission Ranking with Negative Rate
Malicious List Top 33
Benign List Top 33
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH
READ_CALL_LOG
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS
WRITE_CALL_LOG
WRITE_SMS
NFC
READ_SMS
SET_ALARM
BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH
READ_PROFILE
DELETE_PACKAGES
READ_USER_DICTIONARY
BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED WRITE_USER_DICTIONARY
RECEIVE_MMS
SET_TIME
INSTALL_PACKAGES
WRITE_PROFILE
BRICK
BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN
ADD_SYSTEM_SERVICE
SET_PROCESS_FOREGROUND
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR
BIND_REMOTEVIEWS
SET_PROCESS_LIMIT
BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE
RECEIVE_SMS
WRITE_SOCIAL_STREAM
SEND_SMS
READ_SOCIAL_STREAM
SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS
ADD_VOICEMAIL
DISABLE_KEYGUARD
BIND_VPN_SERVICE
FACTORY_TEST
SET_POINTER_SPEED
RESTART_PACKAGES
BIND_TEXT_SERVICE
BIND_APPWIDGET
USE_CREDENTIALS
MODIFY_PHONE_STATE
MANAGE_ACCOUNTS
INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW
CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE
DEVICE_POWER
ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION
PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY
AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS
WRITE_CONTACTS
CAMERA
SET_ALWAYS_FINISH
CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
READ_CALENDAR
BROADCAST_SMS
FLASHLIGHT
READ_FRAME_BUFFER
READ_SYNC_STATS
READ_LOGS
GET_ACCOUNTS
DELETE_CACHE_FILES
CLEAR_APP_USER_DATA
STATUS_BAR
BROADCAST_STICKY
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Table 2.2: Rankings by PRNR
Mutual Information
Top 66
READ_SMS
WRITE_CALL_LOG
WRITE_SMS
VIBRATE
SEND_SMS
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS
DEVICE_POWER
RECEIVE_SMS
WRITE_SETTINGS
INSTALL_PACKAGES
ADD_SYSTEM_SERVICE
READ_PHONE_STATE
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS
RESTART_PACKAGES
WAKE_LOCK
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
WRITE_CONTACTS
GET_ACCOUNTS
READ_CONTACTS
BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
WRITE_OWNER_DATA
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH
DISABLE_KEYGUARD
ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION
DELETE_PACKAGES
WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS
READ_LOGS
USE_CREDENTIALS
CALL_PHONE
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH
DELETE_CACHE_FILES
RECEIVE_MMS
READ_CALENDAR
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS
PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR
GET_PACKAGE_SIZE
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS
STATUS_BAR
READ_CALL_LOG
BROADCAST_SMS
INTERNET
FLASHLIGHT
WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS
BIND_APPWIDGET
GET_TASKS
CHANGE_CONFIGURATION
MODIFY_PHONE_STATE
INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW
SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS
MANAGE_ACCOUNTS
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
READ_FRAME_BUFFER
SET_WALLPAPER
REORDER_TASKS
CAMERA
SET_PROCESS_LIMIT
MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS
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Chapter 3
Evaluation
In this chapter, we evaluate the malware detection effectiveness of the SigPID system.
Our evaluation employs 10,988 apps (5,494 malware, 5,494 benign apps from 310926
benign apps) to build our malware detector. Through pruning, our system identifies
only 34 significant permissions (reduction of 74.8%) and when only these permissions
are used to detect malware, our system achieves 91.9% accuracy. Next, we list the
major results identified through our performance evaluation.
Table 3.1: Results with Multi-Level Data Pruning
Number of Features
135
66
60
34

Status
Orignial
PRNR
PMAR
FPR

Recall
82.16%
87.95%
86.95%
87.67%

Precision
99.33%
93.93%
96.93%
95.98%

Accuracy
90.80%
91.01%
92.09%
91.94%

F-measure
89.93%
90.75%
91.66%
91.59%

STD
0.008640585
0.012360538
0.008236407
0.009718129

1. Multi-Level Data Pruning Effectiveness. Multi-level data pruning consists of
three main components: permission ranking with negative rate, permission
mining with association rules, and support based permission ranking. We
evaluate the malware detection performance by enabling these multiple levels
sequentially to verify the performance improvement contribute by each level of
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permission mining procedure. In addition, we also evaluate the runtime efficiency
of multi-level data pruning. SVM algorithm is employed to perform malware
detection.
2. Malware Detection Effectiveness with Different Machine Learning Algorithms.
We apply SigPID over multiple machine learning classification algorithms to
validate the wide applicability of SigPID mechanism.
3. Comparison with Other Approaches. We compare the classification effectiveness
of SigPID with results of approaches using other permission ranking methods
such as Mutual Information [10].

3.1

Data Set

In this section, we illustrate the process of building a permission dataset. In total,
we have 5,494 malicious apps and 310,926 benign apps downloaded from Google play
store in June 2013 [9]. The malicious apps are classified into 178 families, and the
benign apps are grouped into a single family. Then, the requested permission list
is built by extracting permission requests from each app listed in AndroidManifest
file. The permission information is translated into a binary format dataset where ‘1’
indicates that the app requests the permission, and ‘0’ indicates the opposite. The
permission lists extracted from malicious apps and benign apps are combined to form
a holistic dataset for data analysis.

3.2

Evaluating Multi-Level Data Pruning

In this section, we report the effectiveness of each component of multi-level data
pruning. First, we evaluate the effectiveness of detection system after enabling
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permission ranking with negative rate. We also implement another permission ranking
algorithm based on Mutual Information [10]. Second, we evaluate the detection
effectiveness after enabling permission mining with association rules. Last, we evaluate
the detection effectiveness after enabling support based permission ranking. Finally, we
combine all three approaches to evaluate the effectiveness of multi-level data pruning.

3.2.1

Evaluating Permission Ranking with Negative Rate

First, we implement PRNR to derive both the malicious permission ranking list and
benign permission ranking list. Then, we implement the PIS to incrementally include
permissions based on the ranking lists. Two permissions from both lists are added to
the significant permission list for each round, the results of which are illustrated in
the Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2.
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Figure 3.1: Malware Classification Performance of Permission Incremental System
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Figure 3.2: Standard Deviation with Incremental Number of Permissions
According to Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2, with an increasing number of permissions, the
classification accuracy, recall and F-measure are improving every round. Meanwhile,
the precision slightly degrades every round, but always stays above 95% as shown in
Fig. 3.1. One keen observation is that the recall, accuracy and F-measure plateau
after the number of permissions reaches 66. Fig. 3.2 also shows that the standard
deviation of F-measure is low when the number of permissions reaches 66, i.e., the
malware detection effectiveness remains the same with different datasets. We take
the standard deviation of F-measure, since F-measure is a more aggregated measure
of both precision and recall, the stabilization of which better represents that of the
detection system.
Table 3.2: Results of Using 67 Machine Learning Algorithms
Number of
Features
34
135

Precision

Recall

F_measure

ROC

83.10%
84.78%

95.51%
96.70%

87.97%
89.44%

88.83%
89.73%

Training Testing
(Seconds)
0.77
2.05
4.16
15.31

Total
2.82
19.47
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Fig 3.1 further shows that, after 66 permissions, recall stays above 87%, and
precision stays over 93%. Our malware detection system can accurately classify both
benign apps and malicious apps well when employing only 66 permissions.
In Table ??, we list the 66 permissions in the malicious permission list and benign
permission list. As a comparison, we also list the top 66 permissions using another
permission ranking method called Mutual Information [10]. Different permission
ranking methods induce different ranking lists. For instance, using PRNR, we drop the
permission INTERNET since it shows that both benign and malicious apps often need
INTERNET. However, mutual information based ranking method keeps the permission
INTERNET in the list as permission INTERNET is frequently requested by all apps.
Therefore, we believe our algorithm can retain more significant permissions by pruning
less important or meaningless permissions compared with other permission ranking
methods.
After applying the PRNR method, we evaluate the model and compare the results
with the model using 135 permissions. In Table 3.1, we can find that both methods
achieve nearly 90% accuracy and F-measure. However, by inspecting the results in
detail, we find that the new malware detection model with 66 permissions has a higher
recall rate, and a lower precision rate than the original detection model with 135
permissions. In other words, the new model detects more malware correctly, but at
the same time, it slightly sacrifices accuracy for classifying benign apps. But in terms
of accuracy and F-measure, the new model presents slightly better results. As such,
the new malware detection model with PRNR ranking method is as effective as the
model that uses all permissions.
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3.2.2

Evaluating Permission Mining with Association Rules

Next, we implement permission mining with association rules to perform the second
layer of permission mining. Here, we find 6 rules satisfying our associative requirements
when we set our confidence level to 95%. After pruning 6 more permission features
in the dataset, we only retain 60 features. In Table 3.1, we can see that the new
detection model achieves above 90% accuracy and F-measure. Looking into the details,
we observe that higher precision is achieved with the new model employing fewer
permissions. The association rules mining shows that permission WRITE_SMS and
permission READ_SMS have a 99.5907% chance to appear together. Meanwhile,
permission WRITE_SMS is very frequently used in both malware and benign applications while READ_SMS is used mainly by malware. When we remove the permission
WRITE_SMS, only applications requesting permission READ_SMS are classified as
malware.

3.2.3

Evaluating Support based Permission Ranking

After pruning the dataset with PRNR and PMAR, we continue to improve the
significant ranking list with support based permission ranking (SPR). Support based
permission ranking relies on the fact that some permissions are rarely requested by
apps in the dataset, which can be pruned accordingly. Because different datasets
contain different attributes in terms of permissions, we need to set different thresholds
to prune different datasets. We can implement PIS based on support ranking to find
the least requested permissions that can be used to set the threshold. However, PIS
method brings additional computational overhead. Therefore, here we manually set
the threshold to 0.5%, which is identified based on an empirical evaluation that shows
good results for our dataset.
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Table 3.3: Results with Top 5 Machine Learning Algorithms (Normalized)
Name of Algorithm
RandomForest
PART
FT
RandomCommittee
RotationForest

Precision
93.31%
92.45%
92.04%
92.73%
92.03%

Recall
95.63%
96.54%
96.78%
95.93%
96.66%

F_measure
94.46%
94.45%
94.35%
94.30%
94.29%

ROC
0.98032402
0.973974003
0.960329922
0.979415481
0.978340985

After pruning the dataset with SPR, we only retain 34 significant permission
features based on the dataset. In Table 3.1, we show that the detection model with 34
permissions still achieves above 90% accuracy and F-measure.
Note that the pruning order of MLDP can be rearranged. Based on our results,
we find that both PNRN and SPR can prune more permissions. As such, we can
use these two levels first. After that, we can run the PMAR further to refine the
significant permission list, as it takes more time to build association rules with more
permissions in the dataset.

3.3

Evaluating Malware Detection Efficiencies with

Normalized Detection Rate

Different Machine Learning Algorithms
100.00%
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Figure 3.3: Results with Top 5 Machine Learning Algorithms
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In order to show the generality of MLDP, we present different malware detection
models using different machine learning algorithms in Weka [12]. We experiment with
67 different machine learning algorithms with both the original dataset and the dataset
after data pruning using MLDP. We want to evaluate the performance of MLDP in
any general algorithm in terms of detection accuracy and running time performance.
In Table 3.2, we have the average results of different machine learning algorithms using
34 and 135 permissions, respectively. There is only a minor performance difference
between the case with 34 permissions and the case with 135 permissions. However, by
examining the running time, the models with 34 permissions only take 2.8 seconds
on average, compared to 19.46 seconds from the malware detection model using 135
permissions, which translates into an 85.6% improvement. The detection model with
135 permissions takes almost 7 times as long to run compared to the detection model
with MLDP.
Here, we use precision, recall, F-measure and ROC to evaluate the malware
detection model. In Figure 3.3, we normalize the detection results with 34 permissions
by the performance of the model with 135 permissions. We can see that although the
malware detection model with full permission list can achieve better performance than
the detection model with 34 permissions in terms of the precision, recall, F-measure,
and ROC, the difference is very small. Table 3.3 reports the top 5 malware detection
models that achieve above 94% F-measure, and above 92% in other performance
measures, thereby proving the detection model is still capable of classifying the
malware and benign apps with high accuracy.
Figure 3.4 reports the execution time of using 34 permissions, normalized to the
execution time of the model with 135 permissions. The new malware detection model
consumes about half the time of the model with a complete permission list. Meanwhile,
less features in the dataset also can save lots of memory space. Surprisingly, if we use
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Figure 3.4: Runtime Performance with Top 5 Machine Learning Algorithms
PART algorithm [13], more than 90% time can be saved comparing to the malware
detection model with the complete permission list.
Based on the tested 67 machine learning algorithms, we also find that the machine
learning methods based on tree structure can produce better results. Among the
top 10 efficient algorithms, 5 are designed with tree structures. The tree structure
based method usually takes a large amount of space and time to run the classification
process, so our MLDP can serve as a solution to help significantly improve running
time efficiency of the malware detection model based on tree structures.

3.4
3.4.1

Improvement of MLDP
Scalability of MLDP

We have shown that MLDP can work well when we used 1,661 malicious apps and a
selection of 1,661 apps from a corpus of 310,926 benign apps. We discovered that 34
out of 135 permissions are significant ( a reduction of 74.8%). When we used these 34
permissions to detect malware, our system achieves 91.9% accuracy. Our proposed
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approach performed better in terms of both f-measure and accuracy than using the
full permission set. In order to show scalability of SIGPID, we enlarge our data set
by roughly 3 times; that is, the new dataset contains 5,494 malicious apps and 5,494
from 310,926 benign apps. Note that we use PIS in both PRNR and SPR.
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Figure 3.5: First Step: Malware Classification Performance of PIS in PRNR
From above Fig. 3.5, at least 90 permissions are needed to build a stable system
based on PRNR. This is different than when we used a dataset containing 1,661
malicious apps. In that scenario, we need only 66 permissions to build a stable system
based on PRNR. This difference is expected as different datasets should result in
different points to stop PIS.
From Fig. 3.6 , the graph becomes stable very soon after we finish the SPR. We
only need 15 permissions to build a stable system. We also provide Table 3.4 to report
f-measure and accuracy in greater details.
We can achieve the best f-measure when we use 25 permission in the second PIS
with SPR. We can also achieve the best accuracy by using 40 permissions with SPR.
Note that when we use threshold ε which use 34 permissions, we get comparable results.
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Figure 3.6: Second Step: Malware Classification Performance of PIS in SPR
Table 3.4: Malware Classification Performance of PIS in SPR
Num_of_Feature
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
135

Precision
91.29%
90.21%
90.12%
90.47%
90.64%
91.27%
91.83%
96.28%
96.28%
96.34%
96.35%
98.81%

Recall
83.90%
90.24%
91.21%
91.65%
91.77%
90.58%
90.05%
86.19%
85.94%
85.82%
85.80%
83.73%

FM
87.44%
90.22%
90.66%
91.05%
91.17%
90.82%
90.80%
90.96%
90.82%
90.77%
90.77%
90.65%

ACC
87.94%
90.22%
90.61%
91.00%
91.10%
90.82%
90.86%
91.43%
91.31%
91.28%
91.27%
91.36%

X-value
0.073838409
0.000292543
0.010895847
0.011831152
0.01127205
0.006842435
0.017821964
0.100880652
0.103398698
0.105208413
0.105515343
0.150770346

As such, regardless whether PIS or a threshold is used, the number of significant
permissions is much smaller than 135, which is the total number of permissions.
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3.4.2

Algorithm: Fusion of Multiple Lists

In our MLDP, we use two rank lists, so we need to apply PIS twice to find the
significant permissions. Because PIS is rather an expensive process, one option, as
described in Chapter 2, is to fuse multiple lists into one list and then apply PIS just
once. Table 3.5 reports the basic statistics of the normalized positive rate list and
frequency list.
Table 3.5: Statistics Analysis For Normalized Positive Rate List and Frequency List
Positive Rate
Frequency

MAX
1
1

MIN
0.242818576
0.001392218

AVG
0.640458489
0.084424815

MED
0.659144017
0.025134806

STD
0.220992305
0.154414719

From Table 3.5, after we take the absolute values of values in the negative rate
list, we can remove permissions with low scores. A low score is defined by mean −
standard deviation. The value of the normalized positive list follows the normal
distribution. However, values in the frequency list do not follow the normal distribution.
As shown in Fig 3.7, apps frequently used about 40% of permissions. As such, we
can not use normal distribution to remove insignificant permissions. Instead, we use
a very small threshold as 0.1% to remove the permissions with low usage frequency.
The usage frequency is defined as how many time a permission is used divided by the
number of apps in the corpus.
Next, we need to calculate the new score for each permission. As mentioned earlier,
we experiment with using three functions (Function 5 to Function 7. Table 3.6 reports
the top 40 permissions with RANK1 with function 5, and RANK3 with function 7.
As shown, the rankings are different. Specifically, N F C is considered as the most
significant permission by Function 5. While it has a high positive rate, it also has
a very low frequency (0.15%). This means that is is not significant. This table also
shows that Function 7 produces a more meaningful significant permission list.

Percentage
0
FOTA_UPDATE
SET_POINTER_SPEED
WRITE_SOCIAL_STREAM
SET_PROCESS_FOREGROUND
SET_TIME
SET_ANIMATION_SCALE
DIAGNOSTIC
SET_ALWAYS_FINISH
SET_TIME_ZONE
WRITE_USER_DICTIONARY
BRICK
READ_USER_DICTIONARY
MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS
READ_SYNC_STATS
ACCOUNT_MANAGER
SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_READ
INJECT_EVENTS
NFC
AUTHENTICATE_ACC OUNTS
ADD_SYSTEM_SERVICE
SET_ORIENTATION
STATUS_BAR
SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS
CONTROL_LOCATION_UP DATES
BATTERY_STATS
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR
DELETE_CACHE_FILES
READ_CALENDAR
ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION
MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
SET_ALARM
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS
BLUETOOTH
RECORD_AUDIO
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
READ_LOGS
CAMERA
RESTART_PACKAGES
WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS
CALL_PHONE
READ_CONTACTS
VIBRATE
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
READ_PHONE_STATE

Frequency
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Figure 3.7: Frequency of Permissions

After building a new list, we need to rank permissions by the new scores and try

PIS with the new rank list. Fig 3.8 shows the new results with PIS.
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Figure 3.8: Malware Classification Performance of PIS with FML

Fig 3.8 shows that we can build a stable and high performance malware detection
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system as little as 15 permissions. The PIS stopping point is reached much sooner
than when we use the permission ranking list with negative rates. This can lead to
significant time savings. Also note that with 15 significant permissions, we can achieve
90.67% f-measure, which is higher than 90.65% with using 135 permissions. It also
achieves nearly the same results as using the top 40 permissions, which achieves the
best results in both f-measure(91.12%) and accuracy(91.54%).

3.4.3

X-value

We then introduce X-value as a predictive maeasure to indicate that f-measure is about
to be stable. X-value represents the average distance between precision to f-measure
and recall to f-measure. When X-value is close to 0, it means precision, recall and
f-measure are very close. When they are very close, the PIS stopping point should be
near.
Fig. 3.9 and Fig. 3.10 is the X-values from Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6.
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Figure 3.9: X-value in PIS with PRNR
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Figure 3.10: X-value in PIS with SPR
From Fig. 3.9, PIS with 85 permission holds lowest X-value. Also shown, f-measure
becomes stable with 90 permissions. From Fig. 3.10, PIS with 10 permission holds
lowest X-value, and the f-measure is stable with least 15 permissions. Then, we can
decide a small threshold β. If X − value smaller than β, we only need to perform
a few more iterations of PIS (usually no more than 3 more iterations), and pick the
biggest f-measure as our best results.
Based on an empirical evaluation, we set the 0.01 as our threshold. For example,
in PIS with SPR, we find the 10 permissions is the stop points. Then we continue
to calculate the models with 15 permissions (first iteration), 20 permissions (second
iteration) and then 25 permissions (third iteration). Then, we find that using 25
permissions returns the best results of 91.05% f-measure and 91.00% accuracy. We
also experiment with using more than three iterations but find no improvements after
three iterations.
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3.5

Comparison with Other Approaches

In this section, we compare our detection results with other malware detection
approaches, listed as follows:
• Drebin [9] is an approach that uses static analysis to build data set based
on permissions and other features from apps. It then utilizes Support Vector
Machine (SVM) algorithm to classify malware dataset.
• Permission-induced Risk Malware Detection [10] is an approach that
applies permission ranking, such as mutual information. They use the permission
ranking and choose the top 40 risky permissions for malware detection.
The comparison results are shown in Table 3.7. Drebin uses more features than our
SigPID, including API calls and network addresses. As a result, Drebin outperforms
PermissionClassifier in detection accuracy. We also compare the results against
10 existing anti-virus scanners [9].
In addition, we also evaluate the mutual information based permission ranking
method [10]. The malware detection with only Mutual Information, produces 82.08%
recall, 99.53% precision, and around 90% for both accuracy and F-measure. The
mutual information based ranking method only takes risky permissions into account
which might miss some of the important differentiable permissions. In addition, many
insignificant permissions will still be retained for such permission-based malware detection method. As mentioned previously, permission INTERNET would be considered as
a risky permission in Mutual Information, which is actually an insignificant permission
as shown by our results.
Table 3.7 shows that when we combine SigPID with PART, we can outperform all
other detection tools using only 34 permissions. On the other hand, the permission lists
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used by Drebin contain many meaningless features, and performance improvements
can be achieved by integrating SigPID with PART into Drebin to improve both
malware detection accuracy and running time performance. We will explore this
integration in our future work.
Discussion. Compared to other permission rankings that only consider risky permissions, SigPID considers a broader criteria that also include non-risky permissions
(e.g., READ_CALL_LOG), which is only used in benign apps and has a high support
of the whole dataset. We call the risky and non-risky permissions with high support
significant permissions, allowing SigPID to be more effective at distinguishing between
malicious and benign apps than results reported by previous work.
We also see that, despite a small number of permissions, our approach outperforms
most of existing malware scanner available today. This is because most of these
techniques rely on signature matchings; so if a type of malware signatures is not
available, the system would not be able to detect that particular type. We also show
that our approach is more effective than DREBIN when we combine our permission
pruning with PART. DREBIN is a more complex malware detection approach that
also uses static program analysis. We plan to also explore a combination of using static
program analysis with SigPID to assess whether we can achieve higher detection
effectiveness.
In this work, we only consider one permission ranking algorithm at a time. It is
possible that a composite ranking schemes that combines two or more algorithms may
provide more power to identify malware while using even fewer significant permissions
without losing its effectiveness. In addition, we observe that permission rankings can
prune more permissions with little negative impacts on malware detection. As such,
we think applying permission rankings before permission mining with association rules
can potentially improve the efficiency. Lastly, it would be quite useful to provide a
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reporting mechanism so that users can better comprehend the results. An example
may include a report of permission ranking in sorted orders. We plan to explore these
research ideas as part of future work.
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Table 3.6: RANK1 VS RANK3
RANK1_Avg
READ_PHONE_STATE
SEND_SMS
READ_SMS
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
RECEIVE_SMS
WRITE_SMS
READ_CALL_LOG
WRITE_CALL_LOG
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS
INSTALL_PACKAGES
SET_ALARM
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
USE_CREDENTIALS
RECEIVE_MMS
DELETE_PACKAGES
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS
AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS
DELETE_CACHE_FILES
NFC
BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH
UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS
SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_READ
GET_PACKAGE_SIZE
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
RESTART_PACKAGES
WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS
SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR
DISABLE_KEYGUARD
READ_FRAME_BUFFER
CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE
CLEAR_APP_CACHE
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
ADD_SYSTEM_SERVICE
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
READ_CONTACTS

RANK3_Combined
SEND_SMS
READ_PHONE_STATE
READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
READ_SMS
RECEIVE_SMS
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
WRITE_SMS
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
INSTALL_PACKAGES
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS
READ_CONTACTS
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS
WAKE_LOCK
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS
RESTART_PACKAGES
READ_CALL_LOG
WRITE_SETTINGS
DISABLE_KEYGUARD
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
GET_TASKS
READ_LOGS
DELETE_PACKAGES
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS
SET_ALARM
WRITE_CALL_LOG
WRITE_CONTACTS
RECEIVE_MMS
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH
CAMERA
UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS
SET_WALLPAPER
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS
DELETE_CACHE_FILES
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS
GET_PACKAGE_SIZE
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
BLUETOOTH
MODIFY_PHONE_STATE
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Table 3.7: Detection Rates of SigPID and Anti-Virus Scanners
Method
SigPID with PART
SigPID with SVMs
Mutual Information
Drebin
AV1
AV2
AV3
AV4
AV5
AV6
AV7
AV8
AV9
AV10

Detection Rate
96.54
87.67
82.08
93.9
96.41
93.71
84.66
84.54
78.38
64.16
48.5
48.34
9.84
3.99
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Chapter 4
Related Work
In this chapter, we discuss related research efforts in malware detection. While there
are many efforts that use static and dynamic analyses to detect malware, they are not
closely related to this work, which employs machine learning/data mining to perform
malware detection. As such, this chapter only focuses on malware detection efforts
based on machine learning and data mining.
Static analysis provides an efficient way to detect the malware targeting Android
devices. Enck et al. [14] provided a security service called Kirin for Android. This
service certified the applications to mitigate the threats from malware at install
time. Kirin performed a security analysis to produce a set of rules to characterize
malware and these security rules were used to match undesirable security configurations
for applications. They found 5 dangerous applications among 311 most popular
applications from Google Play. The results show that Android security configuration
is helpful to detect malware.
Felt et al. [6] built a static tool called Stowaway, which can be used to detect
overprivilege in Android applications. Stowaway can find what API the application
uses and built a map between each API and the permissions this API needs. It
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covers 85% of Android APIs and this permission map can help to find overprivilege
in applications. Overprivilege was found in one third of the 940 applications. The
reason is that programmers sometimes follow less privilege strategy and Google dose
not provide enough documentation for permissions.
SCanDroid [15] is a static analysis tool to detect the violations of information flow,
and it recommends that whether an application can be installed without violating
other applications’ permissions. However, source codes of the applications are needed
to do the analysis, which is the weakness of this tool. CHEX [16] is a static analysis
tool to discover permission leakage in Android applications. It can check several types
of vulnerabilities, however, the manifest that is related to the Activity’s exported
attribute is not checked by it. Kantola [17] modifies the configuration semantics to mark
Activity classes as public and uses the heuristic-based approach to fix vulnerabilities.
Grace et al. [5] implemented a system, RiskRanker, which can discover dangerous
behaviors of an app via static analysis. This system reported 3,281 risky apps, among
these apps, 718 are malware samples and 322 of them are zero-day.
DREBIN [9] is a static analysis tool which combines permissions and APIs with
machine learning to detect malware. They embedded features in a vector space,
dicovered patterns of malware from the vector space, and used these patterns to
build the machine learning detection system. Their evaluation results indicate that
their proposed work can achieve high detection accuracy. However, their analysis is
performed on the devices and therefore, it requires that those devices be rooted.
Dynamic analysis approaches, on the other hand, monitor runtime behaviors. They
exercise targeted applications, monitor app activities and collect the relevant data to
help with analysis of runtime behaviors.
TaintDroid [7] is a dynamic taint tracking system for tracking multiple sensitive
data source simultaneously. TaintDroid provides real time analysis by using Android’s
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virtualized execution environment. 30 popular third-parity applications were monitored
using this tool and 68 misuses of private information were found among 20 applications.
TaintDroid can be used to monitor sensitive data in order to uncover misbehaving
applications.
Zhang et al. presented a framework called VetDroid [18], which is a dynamic
analysis platform to reconstruct sensitive behaviors according to the use of permissions.
These behaviors can show, i.e., how applications access resources, how these resources
are utilized by applications, and analysts can check the sensitive information based on
these behaviors. They applied VetDroid to construct malicious behaviors of malicious
apps in order to ease malware analysis. It can also find more information leaks than
TaintDroid[3]
Zhou et al. [19] proposed a system called DroidRanger, which is a dynamic
permission-based behavioral scheme to detect new malware samples from existing
families. They identified certain inherent malicious behaviors by applying an heuristicsbased strategy. DroidRanger can detect 211 infected applications among 204,040 apps,
and they discovered two zero-day malware.
Yan et al. [20] presented a platform called DroidScope, which reconstructs the
semantics and exports APIs for three levels of Android device: hardware, OS and
Dalvik Virtual Machine. Several analysis tools were also provided to gather instruction
traces, API activities and to track information leakage. DroidScope is an effective
platform for analyzing malware samples.
AppsPlayground [21] is a framework that automatically analyzes Android applications. It integrates different detection and exploration techniques for the analysis. The
evaluation indicates that AppsPlayground can detect privacy leakages and malware
effectively.
Machine learning and data mining techniques such as SVM, Random Forest,
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Decision Tree and clustering algorithms, have been used to classify unknown malware
samples into existing families. Researchers have been combining program analysis with
machine learning and data mining techniques in order to improve the performance of
their detection systems. Although there are many malware detection system based
on the signature, applying machine learning and data mining to detect malware
has recently gained popularity including detecting malware in Microsoft Windows
workstations [22].
Previous work has used Android permissions to detect malware. Huang et al. [23]
explored the possibilities of detecting malicious applications based on permissions
using machine learning. They retrieved not only all the permissions, but also several
easy-to-retrieve features from each APK to help detect malware. Four common
machine-learning algorithms, AdaBoost, Naïve Bayes, Decision Tree and SVM, are
employed in their system to evaluate the performance. Experimental results show
that more than 80% of the malicious samples can be detected by the system. Because
the precision is not high, their system can only be used as a first level filter to help
detecting malware. A second pass of analysis is still needed for their system. We can
achieve a much higher detection rate compared to this work.
DREBIN [9] combines static analysis of permissions and APIs with machine
learning to detect malware. They embedded features in a vector space, discovered
patterns of malware from the vector space, and used these patterns to build the machine
learning detection system. Their evaluation results indicate that their proposed work
can achieve high detection accuracy. However, their analysis is performed on the
devices, and therefore requires that those devices be rooted. They extracted as many
features as possible to help improve performance. However, our work only employs
the significant permission features, which reduces the overhead of computation while
retaining a satisfying result.
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Wang et al.

[10] explore the permission-induced risk in Android apps using

data mining. They perform an analysis of individual permission and collaborative
permissions and apply three ranking methods on the permission features. After the
ranking step, they identify risky permission subsets using Sequential Forward Selection
(SFS ) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). They evaluate their approach using
SVM, decision tree and random forest. The result shows that their strategy for
identifying risky permissions can achieve a 94.62% detection rate with a 0.6% false
positive rate. Our work needs less permissions compared to this work, but a high
detection rate can still be achieved.
Schultz et al. [24] use data mining to help with malware detection. They extract
static features from executable binaries and use Naive Bayers to find malware patterns.
Their unsupervised environment makes the validation of the results more difficult than
our supervised approach. Many of these line of work extract features from dynamic
behaviors, which needs more computation and run time information. Nevertheless, our
permission strategy is not only a static analysis based approach, but we also further
reduce the number of permissions needed to make the system more efficient.
FIRMA [25] is a tool that clusters unlabeled malware samples according to network
traces. It produces network signatures for each malware family for detection. Work
by Perdisci et al. [26] introduces a behavioral malware clustering system based on
HTTP traffic. They define a set of similarity metrics of HTTP traces. Their approach
then clusters these traces and generates high-quality malware signatures. Nari et
al. [27] proposes a framework to automatically classify malware into the existing
families. They extract the network behaviors from PCAP files and build a graph
based on network activities and flows. They use the characteristics of this graph such
as vertex out-degree to be features to classify malware. SMASH [28] make use of
HTTP communication to detect attacking campaigns and malicious communication
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campaigns via a unsupervised data mining approach. Again, these approaches only
utilize a subset of information available in the HTTP header.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have shown that it is possible to reduce the number of permissions
to be analyzed in mobile malware detection, while maintaining high effectiveness and
accuracy. SigPID has been designed to extract only significant permissions through a
systematic, 3-level pruning approach. Based on our dataset, which includes over 1000
malware, we only need to consider 34 out of 135 permissions to improve the runtime
performance by 85.6% while achieving over 90% detection accuracy. The extracted
significant permissions can also be used by other commonly used supervised learning
algorithms to yield the F-measure of at least 85% in 55 out of 67 tested algorithms.
SigPID is highly effective, when compared to the state of the art malware detection
approaches as well as existing virus scanner. It can detect 96.54% of malware in the
dataset, while other approaches can only detect 3.99% to 96.41%.
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Chapter 6
Future Work
In this thesis, we introduce SIGPID, a new system to detect malware based on
significant permissions. The evaluation results show that it can work well, with the
malware detection rate of 96% when we use only 34 out of 135 permissions. However,
supervised learning with permissions alone can not solve all major problems in mobile
security. Thus, we need to find other meaningful features that can be used to detect
other types of security vulnerabilities and attacks as part of our future research.
In DREBIN [9], besides permissions, they also collect APIs, network address which
is helpful to detect the malicious apps. After collecting more features, we believe
SIGPID can find other significant patterns from the whole dataset, and build a more
effective malware detection detection system that can be used to detect other forms
of attacks such as collusion.
In this thesis, we also implemented and evaluated 67 supervised learning algorithms.
Different machine learning algorithms are suitable for different datasets. I hope that
we can develop a new machine learning algorithm which is more suitable for classifying
malicious apps in smart-mobile devices. This will undoubtedly require more insights
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into the behaviors of such malware, profound thinking, and study into the dataset’s
type and structure.
While observing the use of permissions and APIs allow us to identify their usage
frequencies within an app and across a collection of apps, we can still see that there are
some apps that are more sophisticated to simply use this simple observation. Instead,
we may need to include both static program structure information (e.g., static call
graphs and calling context) and runtime information (e.g., dynamic call graphs) to
further classify behavior and pinpoint locations of malicious code. For example, a call
to method M3 by method M0 may not instigate any malicious behavior. However, a
call to M3 by M1 may instigate malicious behavior due to the arguments passed into
M1 by M1. This additional information can help us to classify the apps when they
use same permissions or APIs.
One important trend that has been observed by many security analysts and
researchers is that malware writers tend to use variations of existing known malware.
This provides us with an opportunity to extract code signature (e.g., structure, calling
context, variable usage) as a way to detect variations of the same malware. This can
increase effectiveness of malware detection in the future.
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